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Abstract—Historical Mechanisms allow rational analysis of 
world history under Unitarian views in its complexities and 
dialectical differences especially power structures and their 
conflicts. Apparent specialties relate themselves, after 
modifications of space and time without losing anything of their 
fascination. Following Goethe, the general exists out of many 
peculiarities but within peculiarities is always the general. 
Exceptions can be explained easier. Historical Mechanisms 
represent the unity of world historical processes which usually 
would fall apart with the enormous chaos of details. Naturally a 
Unitarian and absolute formula for world history still cannot be 
found. But the categories and metaphors from the natural 
sciences allow a better overview of historical processes. Detailed 
research is important as well, however, it needs to be located 
within world historical lines, and otherwise specific events cannot 
be understood in their full extent. In the article several 
metaphors and pictures will be presented which only serve for a 
better understanding of such processes and simplify them. 
 
Index Terms—Historical Mechanisms, patterns, history, 
natural sciences, metaphor. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE idea to integrate natural scientific methods into history 
was suggested several times in the past. Suggestions by 
Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-97) for example, to integrate pure 
mathematical methods into history, I believe did not work. 
Most historians cannot deal with pure mathematical formulas, 
as the following example of Hempel, how to describe an event 
shows (Fig. 1) [1]: 
                                                    C1, C2, …, Cn 
Explanas                   (statements of antecedent conditions) 
                                                    L1, L2, …, Ln 
                                                    (general laws) 
Explanandeum                                    E 
                                (description of the event to be explained) 
 
A different example of placing too much mathematics into 
history is following description [2]: 
     Agent A was in a situation of kind X. 
     When in a situation of type X, the thing to do is B. 
     Therefore A did B. 
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A historian cannot describe the complexity of history with 
these formulas. Natural scientific categories, however, can be 
used in order to recognize and understand repeating patterns, 
structures and processes within history. With this approach the 
categories cannot be viewed from a pure mathematical 
perspective or mechanical one in the sense of classical 
mechanics. They are pictures and metaphors in order to 
explain complex systems within history much easier. It makes 
it possible to recognize historical processes and patterns; the 
historian may be able to analyze present events and place 
them into the appropriate context. It needs to be stressed that 
following the theory of chaos, exceptions are allowed and not 
everything can always be predicted. Even in the natural 
sciences the scholar always lives between the general laws and 
laboratory experiments. History cannot be squeezed into 
mathematical formulas. The historian cannot predict the future 
like everyone else; especially the historian cannot predict 
when what will happen where. Through the patterns though, 
he is able to see a vague tendency. Historians do not 
experiment but they can use their experiences of the past in 
regards of the sequence of action and reaction, requirements 
and results. The simplest way to illustrate Historical 
Mechanisms is the use of examples from classical physics and 
mechanics: Man as a mass behaves like a mass. Individually 
as well as collective they never can be at the same place. 
Where they collide usually the one or the other side has to 
move or leave. If the two unite temporarily and mix, 
something new can develop. The three major forms of 
existence of mankind can be compared with the three states of 
matter: gas (‘wildness’), fluid (‘barbarism’) and strength 
(‘civilization’). For all three forms quantitative factors 
(number of molecules per space unit) decide the movements 
of molecules and the coexistence of matter, but it is also 
dependent of another coefficient: temperature. Even the Law 
of Inertia can be used for history: Major historic formations 
such as fascism and communism do not disappear suddenly 
after their collapse, but they will after major after-effects for a 
while afterwards. 
 
II. CHAOS IN HISTORY AND THE COURSE OF WORLD HISTORY 
Everybody remembers the first experiments of school 
physics with small compass needles or iron filings and a 
magnet. Depending how one moves the magnet the direction 
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of the needles change accordingly. If the pole changed 
suddenly from the positive into negative the needles then turn 
around and show in the opposite direction. Nevertheless in 
between there is a short moment of chaos, a short moment of 
new orientation. 
Historians should not excuse themselves in front of modern 
chaos theorists for their different understanding of chaos 
because within history there was always a state of chaos. For 
history a primary and secondary chaos can be defined: All 
civilizations – with the exception of India which entails with 
their many Gods already chaos – described the world before 
their time and outside of their own culture as chaos and 
barbarism. ‘Primary chaos’ is the social-political state before 
and after a civilization with many similar factors that for 
members of a civilization everything from the outside 
remained not understandable, in particular the language of the 
‘barbarians’, divided in uncountable tribes and ethnical units 
with their own language; so it seemed impossible even to 
learn even one single language of these ‘barbarians’. The 
‘primary chaos’ is comparable with the natural state of 
Hobbes describing the moment before the development of a 
state. ‘Secondary chaos’ – often described as ‘feudal’ 
fragmentation – develops from the collapse of centralized 
power structures such as empires with new resulting states 
which fight against each other for their identity, definition and 
borders. All major power and civilization centers have gone 
through such phases of ‘secondary chaos’ usually known as 
times of anarchy or ‘Intermediate Periods’ (Egypt). The 
shortest and therefore giving the name to the concept can be 
found within Russian history with its ‘Smuta’ – ‘Times of 
Disorder’ – between the Rurikide and Romanov dynasties 
(1598-1613). 
Structures of power are in world history horizontally (in 
exchange of expansion and collapse) as well as vertically 
(with the classical pyramid of hierarchy with social, political 
and military structures) everywhere and to all times the same, 
even though there are several varieties existing, because in 
every case at least one ‘specific’ factor can be found. The 
chaos theory presents the according metaphor of the ‘Butterfly 
Effect’: In theory the use of a wing of a butterfly in Brasilia 
can be the cause with several interacting events for a tornado 
on a different continent. The butterfly effect has its historical 
counterpart as the famous last spark which causes an 
explosion such as the events of Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 or 
those well-known famous ‘coincidences’ at the beginning of 
revolutions. In reality, however, there are no ‘coincidences’ in 
history. The most beloved sigh ‘If this or that would have 
happened differently then world history would have taken a 
different turn’ becomes pure speculation. It is something 
different if one asks for alternatives for the moments of 
decisions in order to find out why one decision succeeded and 
another one not. This can make the functioning of historical 
processes clearer. Very often we have the historical dialectic: 
victories become eventually the beginning for defeats, and 
defeats become the beginning for victories. The subjugated 
alternative from yesterday may succeed tomorrow or the day 
after and may be more modified then. The history of power 
structures (for examples states and empires) and social-
political collective-identities (for example parties) are full 
with examples – such as the German-Prussian history from 
1806 to 1871, 1918/19, 1933/38, 1945, 1990, and on the other 
side Russian history from 1815, when it was after the defeat of 
France under Napoleon I the real victor on the continent, to 
1856, 1917, 1945 and 1991. 
As a starting point for an in depth analysis of political 
powers, an analogical picture from the optics, the spectral 
analysis, seems to be appropriate. A historical spectral 
analysis protects one of simplifying a fundamental dualism of 
good and bad. Instead of the reduction of complex realities 
with the picturing of black and white morality with according 
friend and foe thinking the spectral offers room for principally 
endless positions between the two extreme poles: During 
revolutionary times it is possible that political spectra widen 
towards the ‘left’, during counter revolutions towards the 
‘right’. During the Russian Revolution 1917 the once left 
winged Bolsheviks (‘Cadets’, Mensheviks, social 
revolutionaries) moved suddenly to the right or towards the 
centre. Something similar happened during the Weimar 
Republic when the German People’s party (Deutschnationale 
Volkspartei) moved under the pressure of the NSDAP from 
the extreme right towards the centre. 
Even a simple mathematical formula can serve as a 
metaphor: central parameters of quantity and quality – such as 
population and productivity, knowledge and discoveries, 
intensity of communication and the strength of weapon power 
– grew and grow exponentially depending on fluctuations of 
space and time: 
 






0                                     X       0                                       X 
 
Fig. 2: Application of the formula y=x2, on the right the increase 
to more exponentially: y=ex. 
 
Such a growth was regarded until recently as a sign of 
progress, nevertheless we realize today that such exponential 
curves as a formula for self destruction will run into infinity. 
Phases of increased growth usually mark long-lasting 
transitions of the pro-agrarian ‘wildness’ to the extensive 
agrarian ‘barbarism’ from around 8000 BC, and from there 
towards civilization. The more recent growth since the 
Industrial Revolution in 1760 is quicker (and more self 
destructing) than ever before. Due to the fact that human 
development went through highs and lows, within the last 
10,000 years, marked more with the rise and fall of empires, 
financial crises or technical developments, it is possible to 
crystallize a rough development line. It is amazing to notice 
GSTF International Journal on Education (JEd) Vol.1 No.2, November 2013
8 © 2013 GSTF
 
that after the fall of highly civilized empires such as Rome, 
chaos seems to become greater and deeper. The higher the 
development of a civilization, the lower this can fall again. In 
today’s sense this would have fatal results when coal and oil, 
as the major engines of our economy and society would 
diminish, we would fall back from an evolutionary point of 
view by several centuries of human history until a new 
development factor has been found. In mathematics this could 










Fig. 3: Curve of human development in history shown simplified. 
 
Contrary to the opinion of many historians who deal with 
Modern History, several hot spots of modern history cannot be 
explained just like that. The connections of events are much 
more complex. The Balkan states are the best example, whose 
problems today do not result from the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries but reach back to the Roman Empire. Only 
with this approach it is possible to explain ‘chaotic’ events of 
modern times. 
With the influences of events it is similar to probability 
calculation: 
 
                                                          Event 
              Event 
                                                                                     Event 
                                   Event 
 
Fig. 4: Influences of events behave like the probability calculation. 
One event influences another one or several further ones. For simpler 
use I have only used two possible lines leading to an event, but it 
may have many more. 
 
The turn of historical events is built on this system. So it is 
possible for some events in the past which we thought to be 
closed to have still their ‘after pains’ and influence even on 
events today. One example is the Balkans: the border of the 
Roman Empire after its split into East- and West-Rome in 395 
went right through the middle of the Balkans. This border 
developed into a structural border which affects the Balkans 
until today. 
 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP OF HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL 
POWER 
Power built itself up in concentric circles horizontally and 
thins up from the centre to the periphery, except an empire 
built fortified borders such as the Chinese Wall or the Roman 
Limes in Germany. But even China and Rome had their vassal 
and clientele states behind the borders. Due to the horizontal 
structure of the power system a general rule can be found: The 
influences of power and civilization on land become less with 
increasing distance, roughly it can be said it decreased by 
square with the distance which can be best illustrated with a 
positive dot load. If geographical obstacles or classical 
peripheral regions (mountains, forests, wetlands, and deserts) 
are included the influence of power and civilization decreases 
more symbolically expressed with the third square. Just this 
factor of closeness or distance of civilization controls the 
history of every region. 
 
                                                        Indirect Power 
 
 
                                                          Direct Power: 
                                                          Power Centre and 
                                                          Empire people, 
                                                          conquest and 
                                                          annexion 
 
                                                           Indirect Power: 
                                                           Vassal’s (autonomy), 
                                                           Clientele states and 









                 
                     0                                                             Y 
Fig. 5: The influence of a power centre can be illustrated best 
through a positive dot load from physical science. The power of the 
centre falls exponentially. 
 
The logic of the sudden decrease of power in space comes 
from two areas of different power execution: direct and 
indirect reign. Direct reign of unshared sovereignty comes 
from the centre of the power centre and reaches to the region 
of the states people and their immediate neighbors and then to 
conquered and annexed provinces. Typical for direct and 
sovereign reign are taxes. Tributes on the other hand can be 
found in the indirect reign of vassal and clientele states – 
typically presented in concentrically circles. On the other hand 
the strength of peripheral power spheres, which are further 
away from the power centre, continue to grow and they have 
themselves a direct reign over their own power region. All 
larger and smaller reign systems reaching from the Mongol 
Empire to African tribal kingdoms have a similar structure: 
hierarchical ordered governing districts of direct and indirect 
reign – for example on levels of provinces or with vassal and 
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clientele states – and it is a universal phenomena. 
 
IV. RELATIONSHIP OF POWER CENTRE AND POWER VACUUM 
A new power centre usually develops at first from a 
‘primary power vacuum’ – tribes in a chaotic fragmentation of 
the Hobbes ‘natural condition’ at which there was always war 
at seasonal and appropriate times of the year. For the 
formation of a new power centre there are a number of 
possibilities: The strongest tribe reaches the hegemony and 
conquers all other tribes of the surrounding region. Another 
possibility is the partnership of several tribes in order to 
defend themselves and remain together afterwards – usually 
under the leadership of the strongest union partner, the 
hegemon. This is usually the name in the history of the Greek 
polis and usually it is the strongest partner who also gets the 
military supreme command. The third possibility happens 
when tribes become tired to fight for elementary goods (water, 
ground or resources) and come to an agreement to bundle their 
energies and fight against common enemies outside. At a later 
stage new power centers can develop from previous ones – 
usually they are located at the periphery of the old one. 
 
















A: A tribe conquers the other ones and becomes the new power 
centre. At a later stage follows the expansion. 
B: In order to defend themselves from an outside attack several 
tribes or cities amalgamate; at a later stage follows the expansion. 
C: Due to economic reasons several tribes amalgamate in order to 
demonstrate power to the outside. 
 
Usually after one or two generations follows the expansion 
through to conquest. The people of the empire – also 
including closely related people – conquer foreign 
neighboring regions and annex them as provinces. Further 
more to the periphery follow vassal peoples which usually 
except the higher imperial reign after a defeat but they can 
keep their inner autonomy if they pay tributes and offer armies 
in case of war. Further on to the periphery the imperial reign 
ends with clientele states which remain independent. 
Sometimes a country is divided between two rival power 
centers, such as Armenia between Rome and Persia in Ancient 
History or later between Persia, the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia (see also the Machiavellian dictum: ‘The neighbor is 
the enemy. Therefore the neighbor of the neighbor is the 
natural ally.’ Universal history functions after this mechanism 
– from Ancient History until today). Even though there is a 
general tendency of power influence becoming less towards 
the periphery military power of the centre can still be present 
there in the form of military fortresses. 
As long as wars were lucrative due to tributes the blessing 
of the Gods or of Heaven protected the king; he possessed 
‘charisma’ (Europe) or the ‘mandate of the heavens’ (China) 
and religious prestige: success is always right. Due to the fact 
that everything in history will come to an end the opposite of 
expansion – contraction and collapse – will hit every power 
structure sooner or later. Usually this starts with a military 
defeat at the periphery caused by large distances to the main 
centre and the overstretching of transport of reserves. After 
this the development turns around: With the charisma of 
success once gone and the banner of no defeats broken it will 
lead to less loots and tributes to keep followers happy. The 
search of faults escalates to inner conflicts, succession and 
civil wars split the ruling people and annexed provinces will 
rise to revolts against the ruling power. Vassal and clientele 
states will leave the bond and either become more independent 
developing an own power centre or they try to bond with a 
new and dynamic power centre. 
New power centers were usually once previous minor 
cultures and located at the periphery, however had elements of 
civilization, such as the Celts and Germans. Succeeding states 
had to ‘find’ – to define – their borders. For the industrialized 
civilization the definition of borders is very problematic. One 
should not forget the fact that the climax of one power centre 
is always the low point of the other. 
Older power centers decrease to power vacuums, new 
power centers usually develop around former peripheral 
vassals or soldier groups which try to take the power of failing 
power centers. The alternative to the conquest through a 
younger power centre in its full expansion is the decay into 
several after-states. The memory of the perished glorious 
empire lives on, until it will rise restored again after decades 
or even centuries – even if it is more modified from the 
ethical, social, political, religious or territorial levels. The 
‘Restoration’ and ‘Renaissance’ of empires – in modern times 
even republics – indicate a circle in the historical process, on 
the change of unity and expansion, defeat and fragmentation. 
Therefore there is a correlation between expansion and defeat, 
crisis and agony: A power structure cannot win if it is split. 
Inner unity is the requirement for victories at the outside and 
defeats on the outside turn into crisis to the inside. The worse 
the defeat was the bigger the crisis will be. 
Even industrialization could not switch off historical 
mechanisms – maybe modify it more – due to the fact that 
farmers are not the main contributing tax payers and therefore 
they lost their political as well as military influence. In 
modern power structures it happens more often that important 
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defeats at the periphery develop to major crisis – since 1789 
also as civil wars or revolutions as the developments clearly 
demonstrate in France 1789, in Russia 1917 and in Germany 
and Austria-Hungary in 1918. In the same manner the 
downfall of the Second and Third German Reich, the Tsar and 
Soviet empire were similar: Battle of the Marne and 
Stalingrad on the one hand, Russian-Japanese War 1904/05, 
defeats during the First World War and the Afghan War on 
the other hand. 
 
V. FORMS OF EXPANSION 
Formulas of Classical Mechanics come into mind when 
dealing with processes of power policies. Power expands on 
the path of the smallest resistance – the same way as water 
which runs downwards. This can be illustrated by Russia – the 
largest continental empire in world history – which expanded 
into all directions with its permanent expansion. In general a 
slower and controlled expansion seems more promising than a 
fast one. Major empires, such as the Roman or the British 
Empires, could maintain their power status therefore much 
longer whereas a fast expansion leads to a quicker collapse. 
When expanding a power centre has not only to build up their 
power influence but construct also sufficient connection and 
reserve roads for armies. A too fast expansion cannot build up 
a sufficient safety net to maintain the control. Best examples 
are Alexander the Great, Napoleon and Hitler whose major 
empires collapsed within a short time period. The vector 
calculation can give the best metaphor: 
 
                                                Execution of Power 
Power 








Fig. 7: Expansion illustrated by vector calculation and analytical 
geometry. On the left hand expansion with sufficient power influence 
and resource roads, on the right overstretching of the resource roads 
and insufficient power influence. 
 
History shows that even ‘stable’ major empires will be 
inflated too much and the power centre with its population 
will not be in a position anymore to control the empire. Old 
and encrusted structures lead to a moment when the power 
centre cannot react to dangers accordingly anymore. This 
happened to the Roman Empire; the same happened to the 
British Empire because its main efforts were placed in 
oversees and the European continent, whereas the breakaway 
of the oldest colony, Ireland, started the development of the 
end of the empire. 
 
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF QUANTITY AND QUALITY 
A nearly forgotten factor of differentiating states was given 
by Aristotle which is helpful in the analysis of complex 
historical and contemporary power systems. It affects the 
difference between quantity and quality to describe states: 
‘One has to view the factors of each state on its quality and 
quantity. For quality I count freedom, wealth, education and 
nobility; under quantity I understand the superiority in 
numbers.’ So it can be understood that quantity is representing 
the population size and one can add also the territorial state; 
quality in modern understanding would represent freedom, 
economy (‘wealth’) and functional elite (‘nobility’) of a state 
or power. In connection with Einstein (E = mc2) this situation 
can be formulated into a new formula rule: 
Aristotle: Quantity: Population size; including today the 
                                territorial size of a sate. 
                 Quality: Functional elite, economy, education, social 
                                infrastructure, political and military structure  
                                of a state and what this one makes with it. 
Power = Quantity * Quality2 
As a rough guide this formula covers wide areas of world 
history. Major empires are usually strong in quantity and 
quality – including Germany in the centre of Europe, when it 
was politically united with a central government no matter 
how structured (911, 1871, 1938, 1990). A major exception is 
Russia: It was several times strong in quantity, but every time 
when they tried, under strong efforts to reach the strength in 
quality of the usually so hated ideological west, it ended in 
catastrophes. On the other hand the effect of the square quality 
was able to raise the world position of small factors – city 
states, small territorial states in their ‘Golden Age’ (such as 
Portugal and the Netherlands) or small groups such as the 
Jews who had to deal, for the most part of their history 
without a state so literally without any aspect of quantity. 
 
VII. BORDERS AND THE CENTRE 
The general weakening of power and its execution at its 
edges highlights the role of border and periphery in history. 
We are so fixed centrally that the important role of the border 
always fades away. The border of each living organism is the 
skin. But borders are also always transitional and do not 
function through hermetical closure but through sensitively 
regulated transitions. The collapse of the Soviet Union is the 
most recent known example of self-destructive closure. 
Borders are never as rigid as we believe with our modern 
fixation of borders as lines in landscapes and maps. They are 
dynamical in space and time and they are often leaky: 
materials, people, goods and ideas diffuse. Borders may serve 
as linear and confronting fences, but they are also zones of 
transitions, mixture and exchange. The fate of all power 
structures from victorious expansion towards contraction and 
collapse through a deciding defeat was always decided at the 
periphery. 
The difference between border line and border region 
becomes clear: the modern linear meaning is rigid, static and 
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often related to states. The older reality is looser, open, and 
vague and towards the periphery it becomes blurred without 
any precision of space and time. A better understanding can 
be provided from etymology. ‘Border’ (‘Grenze’) is one of the 
few German words having Slavic origins. As Tacitus reported 
of the Germans, ‘Granica’ was purposely left inhabited space 
between tribes; it was ‘wilderness’, ‘no-mans-land’, natural 
isolation between usually neighbors fighting each other. Due 
to population increase and general demographic pressure these 
isolation areas disappeared slowly. The last remains of such a 
‘Granica’ between Poland and Russia is the wild forest region 
of Biolowize. 
A very rouge differentiation can be tried for orientation: 
The more civilized, structured and hierarchical a society is the 
more borders tend to become lines and marked with border 
stones. On the other hand borders became blurry between 
older societies. 
Universal expansion grows through moving borders. The 
American historian Frederick W. Turner explained 
peculiarities out of Democracy in America written by Alexis 
de Tocqueville as the ‘moving frontier’. Even being skeptical 
of some details the principle of the ‘moving border’ can be 
universalized: there are many ‘moving borders’ with structural 
self similarities – expansion of mankind anyway, but also the 
agrarian production, civilization, great religions, empires, 
industrialization and ideologies. ‘Moving borders’ as a 
universal phenomenon can also be described as ‘edge 
cultures’ which are located at the periphery of civilization. 
Peoples are directly influenced by civilization and recipe 
diffusing elements either through trade and religion at peace 
times or through war – Scythes, Thraces, Celts, Germans and 
Armenians formed edge cultures during Greek-Roman ancient 
times in the transition to evolve into civilizations. 
Deceases in power centre ‘edge cultures’ can rise to new 
power and civilization centers and take over their 
predecessors: Persia, Hellas, Macedonia, Rome, America (as a 
New-Europe an edge culture of Old-Europe), Japan, the 
German Eastern border countries (Austria, Brandenburg-
Prussia) and Moscow. Out of the ‘moving borders’ of the, at 
first extensive agrarian production grew the first civilizations 
at Nile, Euphrates and Tigris, later at the Indus. Once as 
marginal viewed peoples – barbarians – mutated through 
‘edge cultures’ to own civilization and power centers and gave 
themselves in the ‘cultural death’ their civilization to the 
succeeding one: Egypt, Babylonia, Phoenicia, Crete, Hellas, 
Rome, Latin Europe, America, East- and Southeast-Asia. 
Something similar started with the Industrial Revolution when 
the economical centre of Western Europe moved from Italy-
Tuscany to Flanders and Holland to England. 
Where the expansion stopped for a longer time period and 
civilization differentiated deeply, a so-called ‘Structural 
border’ developed in Europe from West to East: the Roman 
Limes, the borders of the Carolingian Empire at around 800, 
the schism between Western Latinity and Eastern Orthodoxy 
in 395/1054 and the borders of Reformation and Counter 
Reformation 1517/1663. Out of this developed two 
civilization, wealth, power and prestige gradients: the older 
one from South (Hellas, Rome) to North, the younger one 
since Caesar even, from West to East. 
 The classical South-North-gradient changed in modern 
history, certainly since the Industrial Revolution into a North-
South-Gradient, which continued towards the South in Africa. 
The West-East-gradient on the other hand – increased with the 
French Revolution and Industrial Revolution – remained over 
the last two thousand years the same. 
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